A nuclear threat is an incident that could lead to at least only an unintended nuclear detonation or explosion. These incidents most often occur with an alleged imminent threat to a nuclear-weapon country, which will lead to retaliatory strikes against the alleged aggressor. The damage caused by international nuclear exchange should not be limited to the participating countries, since the alleged operational modernization of the climate, associated with a small-scale regional nuclear war, could threaten food production in the world - a scenario known as nuclear famine. If you liked this place, well, and plan to receive additional data concerning escort moscow, please visit the website.[1]
Despite the decrease in global nuclear tensions, and significant reductions in nuclear weapons after the end of the cold war (in 1992), [clarification needed], it is recognized that the world's nuclear warhead stocks amount to about 15,000 units, at the same time 90% stocks are conducted in the usa and russia. The total amount.[2]
Although it is difficult to find accurate data on all nuclear threats, the analysis of specific cases has highlighted the importance of many factors in preventing accidents. In the international market, this includes the importance of text and visual mediation; at the national level, the effectiveness of government engineering systems, and the participation of key decision makers; and at the individual level, the decisive role of individuals in following sympathy and accepting informed decisions, often in violation of protocol.[3]
1 1950 - years 1.November and a half 1956
2.One and a half october 19602.2 january 24 19612,3 24.11.18 19612,4 25 october 19622.5 october 27, 19622.6 november 9, 19652.7 may 23, 19672.8 april 15 1969
3.1 october 19733.2 november 9th 1979
4.1 15 march 19804.2 september 26, 19834.3 november 7-11 1983
5.1 19915.2 25 january 1995
5 november 1956[edit]
During the suez crisis, the north american aerospace defense command (norad) received a number of simultaneous reports, even about unidentified aircraft over turkey, soviet mig-15 fighters over syria, the downed british medium bomber "canberra" and unexpected maneuvers of the soviet black sea fleet through the dardanelles, which apparently signaled the soviet offensive. Given previous soviet threats to use conventional missiles against france and the united kingdom, us forces thought that these events could trigger a nato nuclear strike on the soviet union. In fact, it is required to go through a simple registration procedure about soviet actions that turned out to be erroneous, misinterpreted or exaggerated. The alleged threat arose as a result of a random combination of events, including a wedge of swans over turkey, a fighter escorting syrian president shukri al-quwatli returning from the capital, a british bomber shot down by mechanical problems, and planned exercises of the soviet fleet.[4]
5 october 1960[edit]
Radar equipment in tula, greenland, mistakenly interpreted the moonrise over norway as a large-scale launch of a soviet rocket. After receiving notification of the alleged attack, norad switched to a high-alert signal. However, concerns about the authenticity of the attack arose due to the presence of soviet leader nikita khrushchev in new york as head of the ussr delegation to the united nations.[Five or six-7]
24 january 1961[edit]
24 january 1961, a b-52 stratofortress carrying two mark 39 nuclear bombs with a capacity of several megatons exploded at the top near goldsboro, state north carolina, having dropped its nuclear charge.[8] crew commander walter scott tulloch ordered the crew to eject in the first rows of 9,000 feet (2,700 m). Five crew members successfully ejected or jumped out of the plane and landed successfully, another ejected, did not survive the landing at all, and two died in the end of the crash.[9]
Information declassified in 2013 showed that only one switch prevented ... Bombs from detonation and transmission of flames and destruction over a vast area."[10] expert assessment, written on october 22, 1969 by parker f. Jones, the head of the nuclear arsenal guards, at sandia's home laboratory, reported that only one simple low-voltage switch with dynamo technology stood between the united states of the country and a major catastrophe," or that it "seems likely" that a short circuit in the lever line is in the process of destruction the aircraft in the atmosphere "could" be carried away to a nuclear explosion.[11]
24 november 1961[edit]
Employees of the headquarters of the strategic air command (sac hq) simultaneously lost access to norad and the designs of the early warning system for multiple ballistic missiles. Since these communication lines were designed to be redundant and independent of each other, the communication failure was interpreted either as the most unlikely coincidence, or as a coordinated attack. The sac headquarters prepared serious efforts for a dizzying takeoff before the plane above in the atmosphere proved that, probably, the attack did not exist. It was later proven that the failure of the only relay station in colorado was the only cause of communication difficulties.[5]
25 october 1962[edit]
During the cuban missile crisis, american military planners expected that sabotage operations would precede any first nuclear strike of developed socialism. Around midnight on october 25, 1962, a guard at the duluth sector control center saw a figure climbing over the security fence. He fired there and activated an alarm about sabotage, which automatically triggered similar alarms at fellow citizens bases in the area. At wolf field in wisconsin, due to the breakdown of the alarm system, a horn sounded instead, which ordered the air defense command (adc) to raise the f-106a nuclear interceptors. The pilots were told that there would be no practical exercises on the alert and, as the reviews of political scientist scott d. Say. Sagan, they completely believed that a nuclear war was starting."[12] before the planes could take off, the base commander contacted duluth and found out about the error. The officer in the command center left on his favorite trip, on the runway, flashing his headlights and signaling the plane to stop. It was discovered that the attacker turned out to be a bear.[12][13]
Sagan writes that the incident raised the dangerous possibility that an adc interceptor accidentally shot down a strategic air command (sac) bomber.[12] the interceptor crews have not received exhaustive information from sac about the projects of transferring bombers to dispersal bases (like volk field) or about classified routes, bombers located in multiple combat readiness for operation chrome dome fly along them. Declassified adc documents later demonstrated that "the incident led to a change in the notification sewer [...] In order to stop the repetition."[12]
27 october 1962[edit]
At the peak of the cuban missile crisis, the soviet patrol submarine b-59 almost fired a torpedo with a nuclear charge while being pursued by the american naval forces. One of several ships surrounded by american destroyers near cuba, the b-59 dived, then to avoid detection, and a couple of days was not able to turn to moscow.[14] uss beale began dropping training depth charges in order to place the b-59 signal to surface; however, the captain of the soviet submarine, along with her deputy, mistook them for real depth charges.[15] since the discharged batteries affected the life support systems of the submarine that could not establish communication with moscow, the commander of the b-59 was afraid that the war had already begun, and gave the order to use a 10-kiloton nuclear torpedo against the american fleet. The deputy commander agreed, but the chief of staff of the flotilla (deputy commander of the flotilla) vasily arkhipov refused the decision to launch. He persuaded the captain to calm down, to emerge from the ground and contact moscow to acquire new orders.[16][17]
At the same hour, an american u-2 reconnaissance plane was shot down over cuba, and someone u-2, flown by us air force captain charles moultsby from eyelson air force base, alaska, deviated three hundred miles (480 km) to the soviet air. Despite the order to avoid soviet airspace for at least 100 miles (160 km), a navigational error caused by the northern lights led to the u-2 flying over the chukotka peninsula, as a result, soviet mig interceptors rose up and chased the plane.[4][18][19] american f-102a interceptors armed with gar-11 falcon nuclear air-to-air missiles (each with a 0. Power of 25 kilotons) were then lifted into the atmosphere to escort the u-2 into a friendly atmosphere.[20] individual pilots were able to arm and launch their missiles. This incident has been kept secret for many years.[21]
9 november 1965[edit]
The emergency planning command center was put on full alert after a massive power outage in the northeastern united states. Several nuclear bomb detectors used to distinguish between regular power outages and power outages caused by a nuclear explosion near major american cities went out of operation due to failures in the circuits, creating the illusion of a nuclear attack.[4]
23 may 1967[edit]
A powerful solar flare, accompanied by a coronal mass ejection, interfered with the functioning of all processes of several norad radars over the northern hemisphere. This intervention was initially interpreted as deliberate radar jamming by the soviets, thus as an act of war. The united states just did not strike back at the nuclear bombers.[22]
15 april 1969[edit]
After the incident with the downed ec-121 in 1969, the f-4 phantom fighters at the kunsan air base were ordered to load b61 nuclear bombs and carry out planning and play for stuffing a nuclear strike on the democratic people's republic of korea (north korea).[23] after a short time, the order was given to retreat. The plane didn't take off at all. It is reported that president richard nixon was drunk when he ordered a nuclear strike on the dprk.[24] the order of resignation was given in the directions of secretary of state henry kissinger.
October 1973[edit]
In the yom kippur army, israeli officials panicked, fearing that the arab invasion forces would seize israel as soon as the syrian army almost achieved a breakthrough in the golan heights, and the us authorities rebuffed israel's request for an emergency airlift to the masses. According to quotes from a former cia officer, general moshe dayan requested and received an extension from israeli prime minister golda meir to arm 13 jericho missiles and 8 f-4 phantom ii fighters with nuclear warheads. The rocket launchers were laid out at the sdot misha airbase, at that time as the fighters were sorted according to a 24-hour notice at the tel nof airbase. It was reported that the missiles were aimed at arab military headquarters in cairo and damascus.[4]
The us discovered israel's nuclear deployment as soon as the lockheed sr-71 blackbird reconnaissance aircraft detected the missiles, and for the same day it began airlift. As soon as the un security council imposed a ceasefire, the conflict resumed when the israeli defense forces moved to encircle the egyptian third army. According to the reviews of former american state department officials, secretary general leonid brezhnev threatened to deploy soviet airborne troops against israeli money and the armed forces of the united states of america were on defcon 3. Israel also relocated its nuclear weapons. The very moment defcon 3 was still operating, mechanics repairing the alarm circuit on the kinchelow air force platform in michigan accidentally activated it and almost lifted b-52 bombers into the atmosphere on the base, before the officer on duty announced a false alarm.[4] the crisis finally ended when prime minister meir stopped all fighting conflicts.[25] declassified israeli documents did not directly confirm these claims, but proved that israel was ready to use "radical means" to get the jackpot of the war..[26]
9 november 1979[edit]
Any computer failures at norad headquarters at peterson air force base, the strategic air command command post at offutt air force base, the national military command center at the pentagon and the alternative national military command center in gorny the raven rock complex led to alarm and absolute preparation for a non-existent large-scale soviet attack.[Five] norad notified national security adviser zbigniew brzezinski that the ussr had launched 250 ballistic missiles with a trajectory specially created for the united states, stating that the decision to strike back should be made by the president within three to 7 minutes. The norad computers then estimated the number of incoming missiles at 2,200.[27] the strategic air command was notified, and the nuclear bombers prepared for a dizzying takeoff. Within six to seven minutes of the initial response, pave paws satellite and radar systems were able to prove that the attack was a false alarm.[4][7][28]
Congress quickly learned about this incident, because senator charles h. Percy was present at norad headquarters during the panic process. An investigation by the general accounting department revealed that the training script was inadvertently uploaded to an operational computer in the cheyenne mountain complex.[4] commenting on the incident, us state department advisor marshall shulman stated that "false warnings like this cannot be considered a rare phenomenon. I'm worried about complacency in working with them."[27] soviet general secretary leonid brezhnev wrote a letter in america. To president jimmy carter that the false alarm was "associated with the highest danger" and "i believe you intend with me what mistakes cannot appear in these matters."[29] just a couple of months after the incident, there were 3 more false alarms at norad, two of them were caused by a computer malfunction. Chips.[5] enter this list forced the national emergency airborne command post to taxi to the page at andrews air force base..[29]
15 march 1980[edit]
A soviet submarine near the kuril islands launched four missiles within the boundaries of the exercise. Of these four, american early warning sensors believe that one was aiming for the us. In a rebuke, the united states called officials to a conference on the opinion of the threat, at which it was proved that the porn bunny does not know the threat, and the situation was resolved.[5]
26 september 1983[edit]
Two or three weeks after the crash of korean air lines flight 007 over soviet airspace, the satellite early warning system near moscow reported the launch of one american minuteman icbm. Shortly after these formalities, he announced that five missiles had been launched. Convinced that much more missiles would be involved in the real american offensive, lieutenant colonel of the air defense forces stanislav petrov refused to recognize the threat as legitimate and continued to convince his superiors that this was a false alarm, until such a move was proved by ground radars.[7][30][31][32][33][34][35]
7 until november 11, 1983[edit]
Able archer 83 is a command and staff exercise, conducted by nato armed forces and political leaders in the period from november 7 to november 11, 1983.[36] the exercises simulated a soviet conventional attack on european nato forces three days before the start of the exercises (d-3), moving on to large-scale chemical warfare (d-1), and on one day (d 1) the exercises nato forces asked for political guidance on the use of nuclear weapons to deter the soviet offensive, it was approved by political leaders. Then nato began to simulate preparations for the transition to nuclear war.[37]
These simulations included 170 flights in the order of radio silence for the airlift of 19,000 american troops to european countries, the regular change of military commands in order not to face a nuclear attack, the use of young practices for the release of nuclear weapons, the use of nuclear command, use and communication (c3) online, to send nuclear orders, the movement of nato forces in a united europe through any of the phases of combat readiness from defcon 5 to defcon 1 and the participation of political leaders like margaret thatcher, helmut kohl and ronald reagan.[38]
The problem worsened in such a way that the leaders called the b-52 sorties "nuclear strikes"[38], the increased use of encrypted diplomatic channels between america and the uk[39] and a false alarm about a nuclear attack in september..
As a rebuke, soviet aircraft capable of carrying nuclear weapons were fueled and armed, prepared for launch on the runway, and icbms were put on alert. The soviet leaders believed that the exercises were a ploy to cover up nato's preparations for the first nuclear strike, and in times of desperation they sent a telegram to their personal stations asking them to provide a certificate of nato's preparations for an attack. The exercises fully corresponded to soviet time estimates, according to which the first nato strike will take from seven to ten days from the hour of making a political decision.[40][41]
The soviet troops retreated after november 11, when the exercises ended, and nato did not exist aware of the full soviet response until british intelligence agent oleg gordievsky handed over secret information.[42]
1991[ edit]
In the army in the persian gulf, the iraqi baathists launched scud missiles at saudi arabia and israel and possessed the required stockpile of weapons of mass destruction. This, together with saddam hussein's previous threat to "burn half of israel" with chemical weapons, led to fears that saddam hussein would order the use of chemical weapons against the us-led coalition or against israel.[43][44] israeli prime minister yitzhak shamir and israeli air force commander-in-chief avihu ben-nun both warned that an iraqi chemical attack would trigger "massive retaliation," implying that israel would respond with nuclear weapons. Meanwhile, us secretary of defense dick cheney, general norman schwarzkopf jr. And british prime minister margaret thatcher all stressed that the use of wmd against coalition forces could lead to a nuclear attack on iraq.[44]
Us secretary of state james baker directly warned his colleague tariq aziz that the states have medicines available to take revenge"provided that iraq resorts to wmd.[45] after the war, the intelligence department of the ministry of defense attributed these dangers associated with keeping iraq from launching chemical strikes to the coalition.[44] however, saddam hussein had a to-do list in case of force majeure situations to launch wmd-equipped warheads at tel aviv when this vel becomes disconnected from the leadership of the iraqi armed forces and also if the iraqi government collapses in the near future, which in principle would certainly cause a retaliatory nuclear strike by israel. Saddam, in the end, did not consider such an option necessary, because a person had not previously felt that such a government would collapse in the near future.[46]
25 january 1995[edit]
Putin boris yeltsin became the first world leader to activate a russian nuclear briefcase as soon as russian radar systems detected the launch of what was later identified as a norwegian research rocket black brant xii is suitable for viewing the northern lights.[47] russian ballistic missile submarines were put on alert within the training for a possible retaliatory strike.[48] when it became clear that the missile did not pose a threat to the russian federation, and was not always considered part of a larger attack, the alarm was canceled. Russia was actually the center of various states previously informed about the launch; however, this provided data did not come before the russian radar operators.[5]
Broken arrow (nuclear)the second cold wardoomsday clocklist of military nuclear accidentsmutual assured destructionnuclear and radiation man-made disasters and incidentsnuclear terrorismnuclear wintersino-soviet border conflictvulnerability of nuclear power plants to attacksworld war iiilinks[edit]
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The washington post diplomatic service.^ "January 25, 1995 - norwegian missile incident". Us european command. January 23, 2012 archived from the original on september 21, 2012further reading[edit]
Gorvett, zaria (august 9, 2020). "Nuclear flaws that almost led to the third world war." The future of the bbc.